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Pitfalls in Proving Price-Fixing: Are Price-Signalling Laws the Answer?
Abstract
Establishing a breach of the price-fixing prohibitions in Part IV Division 1 of the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010(Cth) (‘CCA’) depends on the apparently simple requirement that a ‘contract, arrangement or
understanding’ to fix prices can be shown to exist between competitor corporations. However, proof of any
such agreement has been problematic for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’)
in actions for alleged price-fixing within a range of industries. This article considers the judicial interpretation
of the terms ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ and the type of evidence needed to prove that a price-
fixing agreement exists. It also examines the scope and effect of the price-signalling provisions under Part IV
Division 1A of the CCA and, in the light of international competition law jurisprudence, contemplates how
these provisions may affect the ACCC’s ability to prove price-fixing claims. Possible future directions in this
area of the law, resulting from the recommendations of the recent Harper Review, are explored as well.
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Abstract 
Establishing a breach of the price-fixing prohibitions in Part IV 
Division 1 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
(‘CCA’) depends on the apparently simple requirement that a 
‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ to fix prices can be shown 
to exist between competitor corporations. However, proof of any 
such agreement has been problematic for the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) in actions for 
alleged price-fixing within a range of industries. This article 
considers the judicial interpretation of the terms ‘contract, 
arrangement or understanding’ and the type of evidence needed to 
prove that a price-fixing agreement exists. It also examines the 
scope and effect of the price-signalling provisions under Part IV 
Division 1A of the CCA and, in the light of international 
competition law jurisprudence, contemplates how these provisions 
may affect the ACCC’s ability to prove price-fixing claims. 
Possible future directions in this area of the law, resulting from the 
recommendations of the recent Harper Review, are explored as 
well. 
I  Introduction 
Corporate competitors in Australia are prohibited by pt IV div 1 (‘Cartel 
conduct ’) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘CCA’)1 
from making or giving effect to a ‘contract, arrangement or 
understanding’ that has the purpose or effect of fixing the price of any 
goods or services they supply.2 The inherently anti-competitive nature of 
price-fixing is reflected in the fact that this conduct is illegal per se.3  
 The introduction of CCA pt IV div 1A, ‘Anti-competitive disclosure 
of pricing and other information’ (‘the later provisions ’) on 6 June 2012, 
dealing with instances of price-signalling, sought to amplify existing 
provisions, specifically in relation to private disclosures to competitors,4 
and to impose a general prohibition against disclosures relating to price, 
                                                 
*  BA, LLB (Hons), MA, GDLegPrac, PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond 
University. 
** BCom (Hons), LLB (Hons), LLM, SJD, Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University. 
1  All Part references in this article are to the CCA unless otherwise indicated. 
2  See CCA ss 44ZZRD, 44ZZRF, 44ZZRG, 44ZZRJ, 44ZZRK. 
3  Price-fixing, a manifestation of cartel conduct (collusion between competitors), has been 
condemned as a ‘cancer on the Australian economy’: ‘ACCC Chiefs Past and Present in 
Stand Against Price Fixing’, CCH News Headlines, 25 June 2007, quoting Graeme Samuel, 
the previous Chair of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. It is the 
antithesis of competitive pricing, resulting in higher prices than market forces would permit.  
4 CCA s 44ZZWW. 
  
capacity and commercial strategy.5 The operation of the price-signalling 
provisions is currently restricted to the banking industry.6 
 Under CCA pt IV div 1, establishing a breach of the price-fixing 
prohibition depends on the apparently simple requirement that a ‘contract, 
arrangement or understanding’ to fix prices can be shown to exist 
between competitor corporations. However, proving the necessary 
‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ has been problematic. Indeed, 
actions brought by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (‘ACCC’) for alleged price-fixing within a range of 
industries have often failed on this point. Defeats suffered by the ACCC 
include the dismissal of its price-fixing allegations against various petrol 
retailers in Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (the ‘Ballarat Petrol Case ’)7 and Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (the 
‘Geelong Petrol Case ’).8 Public concern about price gouging and cartel 
activity continues to motivate scrutiny of Australia’s petrol suppliers by 
the ACCC.9 
 This article begins by examining the price-fixing prohibitions under 
the CCA. The article then analyses the Ballarat Petrol Case and the 
Geelong Petrol Case (collectively the ‘Petrol Cases ’), contrasts these 
cases with the more recent case of Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v TF Woollam & Son Pty Ltd (‘Woollam ’),10 and outlines 
the resulting implications of these decisions for the ACCC in its pursuit 
of price-fixing agreements. In particular, the article considers the judicial 
interpretation of the terms ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ —
common to the later provisions as well as CCA s 45, which deals with 
anti-competitive agreements generally — and the type of evidence needed 
to prove that a ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ to fix prices 
exists. The article then examines the scope and effect of the later 
provisions relating to price-signalling — a specific type of price-fixing —
and how these provisions may affect the ACCC’s ability to prove price-
                                                 
5  CCA s 44ZZX. The current Chair of the ACCC, Rod Sims, has described the provisions as 
closing ‘the gap between Australia’s competition law and that in Europe and the United 
States, where anti-competitive price-signalling and information disclosures can be unilateral 
and so more readily addressed’: Rod Sims, ‘ACCC Priorities in Enforcing Competition Law’ 
(Speech delivered at the 2012 Competition Law Conference, Sydney, 5 May 2012). 
6  CCA s 44ZZT(1), as prescribed in the Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth) 
reg 48. 
7  (2005) 159 FCR 452. 
8  (2007) 160 FCR 321. 
9  In a subsequent Keynote address, Rod Sims, Chair of the ACCC, noted that the ACCC 
typically received 1000 complaints and enquiries per year relating to petrol, confirming that 
the ACCC was investigating the sharing of information about prices in the fuel retailing 
sector: Rod Sims, ‘Keynote Address’ (Speech delivered at the 2012 Australasian 
Convenience and Petroleum Marketers Association Conference, Melbourne, 12 September 
2012).  
10  (2011) 196 FCR 212. 
 fixing claims in the context of international competition law 
developments. Finally, the article discusses the impact of the 
implementation of changes proposed by Australia’s Competition Policy 
Review (the ‘Harper Review’), which released its Final Report on 31 
March 2015.11  
 The Harper Review panel recognised that current prohibitions against 
price-signalling in the CCA do not accurately address the distinction 
between anti-competitive and pro-competitive conduct, and that these 
prohibitions are also deficient in their limited application to the banking 
industry.12 The Harper Review also cautions that a per se prohibition has 
the potential to overreach, and proposes that CCA s 45 be amended to 
address price-signalling issues rather than creating a separate Division in 
the CCA.13 Significantly, the Final Report recommends that s 45 be 
extended to cover ‘concerted practices’ that have the purpose, or would be 
likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition — which 
would include the regular disclosure or exchange of price information 
between firms — irrespective of whether or not it is possible to show that 
the firms reached an understanding about the disclosure or exchange.14 In 
this context the Harper Review defines the word ‘concerted’ as ‘jointly 
arranged or carried out or co-ordinated’, and regards a ‘concerted 
practice’ between market participants as ‘a practice that is jointly 
arranged or carried out or co-ordinated between the participants’.15 This 
approach is commensurate with the European approach of ‘concerted 
practices’ and, if implemented, will be a step forward in aligning 
Australian law with European competition law. 
II  Regulation of Price-Fixing 
A  Statutory Prohibitions 
CCA pt IV div 1 attempts to define cartel conduct with specificity.16 
Pursuant to s 44ZZRD, a ‘cartel provision’ is a provision of a ‘contract, 
arrangement or understanding’ between parties that are, or are likely to 
                                                 
11  Ian Harper et al, ‘Competition Policy Review’ (Final Report, Competition Policy Review 
Panel, 31 March 2015) <http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/final-report/>. 
12 Ibid 59. 
13 Ibid 60. In its recommendation the Harper Review panel states unequivocally that the 
‘“price signalling” provisions of Part IV, Division 1A of the CCA are not fit for purpose in 
their current form and should be repealed’. 
14  Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16  The Harper Review panel expressed support for the intention behind the cartel conduct 
prohibitions, but noted that the provisions are ‘excessively complex, which undermines 
compliance and enforcement’ and ‘should be simplified’. Ibid 58–59 (‘Recommendation 
27 — Cartel conduct prohibition’). 
  
be, in competition with each other, which has, or is likely to have, the 
purpose or effect of: 
 fixing prices for the supply, re-supply or purchase of goods or 
services; 
 preventing, restricting or limiting production of goods or the capacity 
to supply goods or services;  
 allocating customers, suppliers and geographical areas in connection 
with the supply or purchase of goods or services; or  
 bid-rigging.  
 Part 44ZZRF criminalises making a contract or arrangement, or 
arriving at an understanding, that contains a cartel provision, and s 
44ZZRG criminalises giving effect to a ‘contract, arrangement or 
understanding’ that contains a cartel provision. The equivalent civil 
penalty provisions are found in ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK, which, 
respectively, render it a contravention of the CCA to make a contract or 
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, that contains a cartel 
provision or give effect to a ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ that 
contains a cartel provision. This arrangement is intended to permit a 
‘proportionate’ response, with criminal prosecution targeted at serious 
cartel conduct while minor conduct is punished civilly.17 
 The distinguishing feature between the criminal and civil penalty 
provisions is the so-called ‘fault’ element inherent in ss 44ZZRF and 
44ZZRG. Drawing on principles of criminal responsibility embodied 
within the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), these Parts require that the 
corporation intended to make or give effect to a ‘contract, arrangement or 
understanding’ containing a cartel provision and knew or believed that the 
‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ contained a cartel provision.18 It 
is also necessary to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt and 
obtain a unanimous verdict of the jury.19 The lesser civil provisions do not 
involve any element of knowledge or belief, and the corresponding 
standard of proof is ‘on the balance of probabilities’.  
 Clearly, ss 44ZZRF, 44ZZRG, 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK have been 
drafted with the longstanding civil provision in CCA s 45(2) in mind. 
                                                 
17  Commonwealth, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission regarding 
Serious Cartel Conduct’ (2009) [1.2]. 
18  Pursuant to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 ch 2, a person has ‘knowledge’ of a 
circumstance or a result if he or she is aware that it exists or will exist in the ordinary course 
of events. The term ‘belief’ is not defined, but presumably refers to a level of awareness less 
than knowledge. 
19  Commonwealth, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission regarding 
Serious Cartel Conduct’ (2009) [6]. 
 This permits guidance from existing precedents and provides businesses 
with a general sense of the conduct to be avoided. 
 CCA s 45(2)(a)(ii) prohibits making a contract or arrangement, or 
arriving at an understanding, if a provision of the proposed ‘contract, 
arrangement or understanding’ has the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. CCA s 45(2)(b)(ii) prohibits giving 
effect to a provision of a ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ that has 
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition.20 In contrast to the cartel conduct provisions, these are not 
per se prohibitions, but are linked to certain requirements in respect of a 
substantial lessening of competition. 
 Two newer provisions introduce a direct prohibition on certain forms 
of price-signalling. Part 44ZZW (the per se prohibition) specifically 
prohibits the private disclosure of pricing information to one or more 
actual or potential competitors where the disclosure does not occur ‘in the 
ordinary course of business’. Significantly, this prohibition does not 
distinguish between past, present and future pricing information, and does 
not require proof of anti-competitive purpose or effect. Part 44ZZX (the 
general prohibition) is a prohibition against companies making certain 
disclosures ‘for the purpose of substantially lessening competition in a 
market’. Thus, a breach of these provisions requires only proof of the 
prohibited unilateral action instead of the collusive elements envisaged by 
s 45(2). At present these provisions apply only to the banking sector;21 
however, the Minister may prescribe further classes of goods and services 
to which they may apply in the future.22 
B  Sanctions 
The CCA applies civil sanctions to parties in breach of ss 45(2), 44ZZW 
and 44ZZX,23 and specifically excludes criminal sanctions for breaches of 
these provisions.24 Corporations are principally liable for such breaches, 
and face a pecuniary penalty of whichever is the greatest of an amount 
capped at $10 million, three times their gain from the illegal conduct, or, 
where the gain cannot be readily ascertained, ten per cent of their annual 
turnover during the preceding twelve month period.25 Individuals may be 
                                                 
20  The composite expression ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’ is thus a familiar one. 
21  CCA s 44ZZT(1), as prescribed in the Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth) 
reg 48.  
22  CCA s 44ZZT(3). Before the Governor-General makes regulations, for the purpose of 
subPart (1), prescribing a class of goods or services, the Minister must be satisfied that the 
prescribed process has been complied with, as prescribed in the Competition and Consumer 
Regulations 2010 (Cth) reg 49. 
23  CCA s 76(1A).  
24  Ibid s 78. 
25  Ibid s 76(1A). For one example of a penalty determination by the Federal Court, see 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Gullyside Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1727, 
  
accessorily liable as persons ‘involved in’ a contravention of the CCA,26 
incurring pecuniary penalties of up to $500 000.27  
 These penalties apply equally to all parties in breach of the civil cartel 
conduct provisions in ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK,28 and also to corporations 
found criminally liable under ss 44ZZRF and 44ZZRG, although the 
language in the latter provisions is slightly different — penalties being 
described as a ‘fine’ rather than a ‘pecuniary penalty’.29 Individuals 
convicted of involvement in the criminal cartel offences in ss 44ZZRF 
and 44ZZRG face maximum penalties of imprisonment for 10 years, a 
fine of up to $220,000, or both.30 
 The higher monetary penalty for individuals found to have breached a 
civil cartel provision than for the contravention of a criminal provision 
reflects the likelihood that a period of incarceration will be imposed in the 
latter instance and recognises the broader ramifications of a criminal 
conviction for an individual.31  
C  Threshold Elements 
The threshold element of both s 44ZZRD and s 45(2) is a ‘contract, 
arrangement or understanding’ between the parties. As the Federal Court 
neatly explained in the Geelong Petrol Case, these three concepts 
represent ‘a spectrum of consensual dealings’.32 While the term ‘contract’ 
is apt to describe a more formal agreement, consistent with its general 
legal meaning, ‘arrangement’ suggests something looser than a ‘contract’, 
and ‘understanding’ suggests something even looser than an 
‘arrangement’.33 Interestingly, however, the case law to date reveals no 
material distinction between the two latter terms.34  
 In fact, the balance of authority indicates that both ‘arrangement’ and 
‘understanding’ involve a ‘meeting of minds’.35 According to the Full 
Federal Court’s judgment in the Ballarat Petrol Case, this requires 
                                                                                                         
another petrol price-fixing case, where pecuniary penalties amounting to $470 000 were 
imposed on two service stations for price-fixing conduct in the Woodridge area of Brisbane. 
26  CCA s 75B(1). 
27  Ibid s 76(1B). 
28  Ibid ss 76(1A)–(1B). 
29  Ibid ss 44ZZRF(3), 44ZZRG(3). 
30  Ibid s 79(1). See also the effect of CCA s 6(2)(b) and the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) sch 1 version of CCA pt IV in 
extending principal liability under CCA ss 44ZZRF–G, 44ZZRJ–K to persons who are not 
corporations. 
31  Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other 
Measures) Bill 2008 (Cth) 34–5 [2.45]–[2.49]. 
32  (2007) 160 FCR 321, 331 (Gray J). 
33  Ibid 331–2, reflecting established precedent. 
34  See, eg, Re British Basic Slag’s Agreements [1963] 2 All ER 807; Top Performance Motors 
Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Queensland) Pty Ltd (1975) 24 FLR 286. 
35  A point confirmed by the Full Federal Court in the Ballarat Petrol Case (2005) 159 FCR 
452, 464 (Heerey, Hely and Gyles JJ). 
 communication between the parties and commitment to a course of 
action, rather than a mere hope or even an expectation that a course of 
action will be followed.36 Later, in the Woollam Case, Logan J, in finding 
that the respondents had come to an ‘arrangement or understanding’,37 
observed that an arrangement or understanding must also ‘be consensual 
and carry with it an element of obligation rather than a mere 
expectation’.38 
 On the question of proving a ‘meeting of minds’, the former ACCC 
Chair, Graeme Samuel, commented that 
Cartel cases come in a variety of shapes and sizes. Some, a very few, have 
written agreements. These are the easiest to prove. More commonly, there is 
no express agreement and the ACCC must rely on a mixture of direct and 
circumstantial or inferential evidence to prove a contravention.39 
 The current ACCC Chair, Rod Sims, has also noted the difficulties 
experienced by the ACCC in proving that an ‘arrangement or 
understanding’ exists between parties suspected of engaging in cartel 
conduct, and referred to the Geelong Petrol Case as providing the impetus 
for the new provisions.40 
 The requirement of ‘direct evidence’ refers to documentary evidence 
or the oral testimony of witnesses. In relation to this type of evidence, 
Samuel cautioned that: 
[In] some cartels, particularly price-fixing cartels … collusion becomes part 
of the normal course of doing business. In these circumstances, it may be very 
difficult for participants to recall specific instances of giving effect to the 
cartel. Obtaining direct evidence that an agreement has been acted on can be 
problematic.41  
 In the price-fixing context, ‘circumstantial evidence’ encompasses 
factors such as:  
 motive, incentive and opportunity of the parties to reach an 
‘arrangement or understanding’;  
 parallel behaviour engaged in by the parties, as well as meetings or 
exchanges of correspondence or other information;  
 the parties’ inability or unwillingness to explain the concurrence of 
their conduct;  
                                                 
36  Ibid. 
37  (2011) 196 FCR 212, 226 [49]. 
38  Ibid 227 [51], citing Lindgren J in Trade Practices Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 
92 FCR 375, 408–9 [141]. 
39  Graeme Samuel, ‘The Enforcement Priorities of the ACCC’ (2006) 14 Trade Practices Law 
Journal 71, 84. 
40  Sims, above n 5.  
41  Samuel, above n 39, 84. 
  
 an unusual pattern of parallel behaviour that cannot be explained 
except by the existence of an ‘arrangement or understanding’; and 
 the parties seemingly acting against their own economic interests (that 
is, each firm would not benefit from the conduct unless its competitors 
behaved in the same way).42  
 Respondents’ justifications for certain actions can be critical to 
rebutting an allegation of price-fixing by showing that independent action 
was taken, that there was no communication with other parties, or that no 
‘commitment’ to other parties was incurred.43 
III  Developments in the Law 
A  The Petrol Cases 
1  The Ballarat Petrol Case 
(a) Federal Court 
The Ballarat Petrol Case commenced when the ACCC instituted 
proceedings against sixteen respondents (eight corporations and eight 
individuals) for price-fixing conduct in the Ballarat retail petrol market 
over the eighteen-month period from June 1999 to December 2000. A 
number of the respondents (four corporations and five individuals) either 
admitted or did not contest the ACCC’s claims and proceeded to penalty 
hearings before Goldberg J in the Federal Court.44 The remaining 
respondents (four corporations and three individuals) proceeded to trial 
before Merkel J. 
 The ACCC’s case against the contesting respondents relied heavily on 
circumstantial evidence involving records of telephone conversations 
between the parties, and correlations between these calls and the timing 
of petrol price rises. In finding that this evidence established a price-
fixing understanding (which had been put into effect on 69 occasions), 
Merkel J accepted that there was a ‘meeting of minds’ between the 
respondents giving rise to the expectation in each of them that the others 
would engage in price-fixing behaviour.45 As a result, all 16 respondents 
in this case were initially found to have breached the then Trade Practices 
                                                 
42  See also Warren Pengilley, ‘What is Required to Prove a “Contract, Arrangement or 
Understanding”?’ (2006) 13 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 241, 244. 
43  Ibid 263. 
44  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) 
(2005) 215 ALR 301. 
45  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2004) 141 
FCR 183, 220. 
 Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’) and were ordered to pay penalties totalling $23.3 
million.46 
(b) Full Federal Court 
 Two of the 17 parties found to have breached the TPA, Apco Service 
Stations Pty Ltd (‘Apco’) and its managing director, Peter Anderson, 
appealed to the Full Federal Court.47 Apco and Anderson contended that 
they were not a party to any price-fixing understanding because there had 
been no commitment on their part to increase prices following 
discussions about prospective price rises. On the contrary, the appellants 
claimed that Anderson made independent decisions about whether or not 
Apco should increase its petrol prices based on his own assessment of the 
Ballarat petrol market, pointing out that Apco only increased its prices on 
29 of the 69 occasions under consideration and not on the other 40.48  
 The Full Federal Court (Heerey, Hely and Gyles JJ) accepted this 
contention.49 Their Honours held that a mere hope or expectation that a 
party will act in a certain way is insufficient to constitute an ‘arrangement 
or understanding’.50 Instead, one party must assume an obligation or give 
an assurance or undertaking that it will act in a certain way.51 Therefore, 
commitment to a course of action was necessary to establish a 
contravention of TPA s 45(2).52 Their Honours then remarked that if:  
Apco and Anderson were not committed to increase prices, the fact that 
sometimes they did so is consistent with them exercising their own judgment 
on those occasions. Unilaterally taking advantage of a commercial 
opportunity presented is not to arrive at or give effect to an understanding in 
breach of the Act.53  
 The ACCC sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. 
However, in June 2006, the High Court rejected the ACCC’s leave to 
appeal application on the basis that the Full Federal Court’s decision did 
not raise any serious issues of interpretation of the TPA.54 
 As it stands, the Full Federal Court’s judgment in the Ballarat Petrol 
Case sets a high evidentiary standard in price-fixing cases under s 45(2). 
In particular, it must be shown that the parties to an alleged price-fixing 
                                                 
46  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 2) 
(2005) 215 ALR 281; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy 
Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301. 
47  Apco had been fined $3 million and Anderson $200,000. 
48  Ballarat Petrol Case (2005) 159 FCR 452, 454 [3]. 
49  Ibid 465–6 [53]. 
50  Ibid 464–5 [47]. 
51  Ibid 464 [45]. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid 466 [56]. 
54  Transcript of Proceedings, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Apco 
Service Stations Pty Ltd [2006] HCATrans 272 (2 June 2006). 
  
‘arrangement or understanding’ are committed or morally bound to the 
agreement. 
2 The Geelong Petrol Case 
(a) Background 
 In the Geelong Petrol Case, the ACCC accused 18 respondents (eight 
corporations and ten individuals) of fixing prices in the Geelong retail 
petrol market during the two-year period from the beginning of 1999 to 
the end of 2000. In the Federal Court, Gray J dismissed the case against 
all respondents, despite several of them having admitted to the ACCC’s 
allegations.55 
 It was not disputed by the respondents that they regularly telephoned 
each other to discuss the price of petrol, and the amount and timing of 
petrol price rises. What was at issue was whether these communications 
constituted an ‘arrangement or understanding’ about how the parties 
would price their petrol. 
 The ACCC submitted that the telephone conversations gave rise to 
eight separate, but interlocking, arrangements, seven of which were 
bipartite and one tripartite. The arrangements were said to have operated 
serially, with price information and commitments flowing from one set of 
petrol retailers to the next.56 The retailers were alleged to have given 
effect to the arrangements on multiple occasions during 1999 and 2000.  
 Unlike the Ballarat Petrol Case, these proceedings did not involve an 
allegation of a single, multi-party price-fixing arrangement.57 Rather, this 
was a complex, factually-dense case in which a multi-party, multi-
transaction arrangement was alleged to exist. 
(b) Evidence 
(i)  Direct evidence 
 To support its allegations, the ACCC relied on the oral evidence of 12 
witnesses who were participants in the Geelong petrol market. Four of 
these were also respondents to the instant proceedings who had admitted 
to the ACCC’s allegations against them.  
 Gray J was highly critical of the evidence of these witnesses for at 
least four reasons. First, almost none of the evidence related to events on 
any specific date. There were no witnesses who could remember a single 
                                                 
55  For useful casenotes on this decision, see Ayman Guirguis and Chris Evans, ‘Cartels, 
Cooperation and Circumstantial Evidence’, Competition Law News (Blake Dawson 
Waldron Lawyers, 19 June 2007) 1–7; Peta Stevenson, ‘Failed ACCC Fixation on Price 
Fixing Leaves Retailers on a High’, Australian Trade Practices News, Issue 589 (CCH 
Australia Ltd, 4 July 2007) 1–4. 
56  Geelong Petrol Case [2007] FCA 794 [121]–[126]. 
57  Ibid [119]. 
 specific conversation concerning the fixing of petrol prices on any 
particular day. Even allowing for the fact that the hearing took place five 
years after the alleged events, his Honour found this lack of recollection 
‘unusual’.58 Second, the evidence did not reveal the origin of any of the 
alleged arrangements or understandings, or even an agreed general course 
of conduct indicative of an ‘arrangement or understanding’.59 Third, 
witnesses’ recollections were often inconsistent with the available data, 
leading to questions of reliability.60 Fourth, none of the witnesses stated 
that they felt constrained to act in any particular way. Consequently, his 
Honour found that there was no commitment by the parties to any course 
of action.61 
 Elaborating on the fourth reason, Gray J explained that, for an 
‘arrangement or understanding’ to exist, there must be an ‘element of 
commitment, or moral obligation, or obligation binding in honour only’62 
to observe and adhere to the ‘arrangement or understanding’. The absence 
of any element of commitment or obligation was therefore ‘fatal to the 
ACCC’s case’,63 since ‘an “arrangement or understanding” in which each 
party is free to do as it wishes is a creature unknown to s 45(2)’64 of the 
TPA. Consequently, Gray J concluded that the ‘overall effect of the 
evidence in this case is that it is more probable than not that none of the 
arrangements … alleged by the ACCC in fact existed’.65 
 The ACCC’s difficulties in this case suggested that the form in which 
evidence was adduced was an important issue in cartel conduct cases.66 
Judges who demanded to hear the evidence of those alleged to be parties 
to an ‘arrangement or understanding’ had to be anticipated. In this regard, 
Samuel notes that there have: 
been moves in the Federal Court toward a preference for oral testimony from 
witnesses over affidavit evidence … [This] has the potential to extend 
enforcement proceedings and introduce more uncertainty into litigation – it is 
difficult to know how any witnesses will perform in the witness box and what 
effect this might have on the case.67 
(ii) Circumstantial evidence 
 The circumstantial evidence in the Geelong Petrol Case consisted 
primarily of a document known as ‘Annexure B’, which contained details 
                                                 
58  Ibid [131]. 
59  Ibid [939]. 
60  Ibid [132]. 
61  Ibid [948]. 
62  Ibid [940]. 
63  Ibid [949]. 
64  Ibid [948]. 
65  Ibid [960]. 
66  The ACCC had planned to use written witness statements in this case, but was directed to 
lead its evidence orally. 
67  Samuel, above n 39, 85. 
  
of telephone calls between the respondents and subsequent petrol price 
movements, and which purported to show a correlation between the 
telephone calls and petrol price increases. However, Gray J found the data 
in Annexure B to be ‘at best equivocal and in many instances more apt to 
refute than to support the ACCC’s contentions’.68 In some instances, the 
document suggested that prices changed independently of 
communications between competitors. In others, it suggested conclusions 
that were inconsistent with the oral evidence of witnesses.69 Gray J 
accepted that ‘a good deal of information about price increases was 
passed between competitors in the Geelong petrol market, most of it by 
means of telephone conversations’.70 However, he held that this conduct 
alone was insufficient to indicate the existence of an ‘arrangement or 
understanding’ to fix prices in contravention of the TPA.71  
 One factor in Gray J’s reasoning was the use by most of the 
respondents of roadside boards to display petrol prices — a practice 
which, in and of itself, would be expected to ensure a high degree of price 
uniformity.72 In his Honour’s opinion, the only difference between being 
informed of prospective petrol price changes by telephone and viewing 
the prices on the display boards was that the telephone notification 
method gave competitors a slight time advantage when deciding how they 
would respond, if at all.73  
 Gray J also considered that the pattern of petrol price rises in Geelong 
was explicable by reference to factors unrelated to allegations of price-
fixing between competitors. These included, for example: that petrol 
prices in the Geelong market generally followed those in the Melbourne 
market;74 that price increases at the end of a discount cycle could be 
justified as commercially rational;75 and, that petrol retailers in the 
Geelong market who were not alleged to be involved in any price-fixing 
arrangement priced similarly to those that were.76  
(iii) Admissions 
 A controversial aspect of the Federal Court’s judgment in the Geelong 
Petrol Case was the dismissal of the ACCC’s allegations against those 
respondents who had admitted entering into and giving effect to price-
fixing arrangements in breach of the TPA. These admissions took the 
form of admissions made in the admitting respondents’ pleadings, 
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 admissions to the ACCC in the course of interviews or examinations on 
oath under TPA s 155, and admissions made in written statements 
prepared and signed by those intending to give evidence on behalf of the 
ACCC.77  
 The ACCC had argued that, before departing from an admission, a 
court would need to be satisfied that it was ‘plainly incorrect’, adverting 
to the policy concerns that not acting on admissions would raise such as 
extending trials unnecessarily.78 However, Gray J held that he had 
discretion to decline to act on admissions where there was ‘reason to 
doubt their correctness’ or ‘reason to question the correctness of the facts 
admitted or agreed’.79 Moreover, his Honour identified three policy 
reasons in support of his approach in the present case. First, where 
admissions are made by parties who lack the resources to conduct lengthy 
litigation in their own defence (and therefore have a powerful incentive to 
make admissions in the hope of securing leniency),80 courts should be 
more willing to set aside the admissions if they consider them to be 
unreliable.81 Secondly, the requirement that witnesses who obtain more 
lenient treatment ‘cooperate’ with the ACCC may encourage those 
witnesses to over-emphasise the role that contesting respondents played 
in the alleged cartel.82 Thirdly, the processes of the court are at risk of 
being brought into disrepute if an application relating to the same set of 
allegations is upheld against an admitting party but dismissed against a 
contesting party.83 
(c)  No appeal 
 Despite its obvious disappointment at the outcome,84 the ACCC 
decided not to appeal against the Federal Court’s decision in the Geelong 
Petrol Case. The ACCC reasoned that the Full Federal Court would be 
unlikely to reverse the findings of fact made by the trial judge given the 
general reluctance of appeal courts to overturn factual findings based on 
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oral testimony where the trial judge has had the benefit of assessing the 
demeanour of the witnesses.85  
B  Implications of the Petrol Cases 
The decisions of the Full Federal Court in the Petrol Cases demonstrate 
the difficulties associated with proving price-fixing under the TPA. The 
carriage of such cases — which often involve a series of events over a 
lengthy period and a large number of parties — can be complicated, even 
when the parties are willing to cooperate with the ACCC in its 
investigations, make admissions, and provide direct written and oral 
evidence. Nevertheless, a number of valuable lessons were learned from 
the Petrol Cases.  
 First, for there to be a finding that the parties entered into an 
‘arrangement or understanding’ within the scope of s 45(2) of the CCA, 
there must be evidence of a commitment among the parties to a particular 
course of action. A mere hope or expectation by one party that another 
party will act in a certain way is insufficient to establish an ‘arrangement 
or understanding’ between them. Secondly, direct evidence adduced 
through the oral examination of witnesses requires specificity (for 
instance, details of what was said in particular conversations alleged to 
give effect to a price-fixing arrangement) in order for the applicant to 
make out its allegations. Thirdly, circumstantial evidence used in support 
of a case must be consistent with, and probative of, the applicant’s 
allegations. Fourthly, parallel behaviour by itself is not probative of 
collusive conduct.  
 The Geelong Petrol Case would also appear to have ramifications for 
the operation of the ACCC’s ‘Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct’ and 
‘Cooperation Policy’.86 It will be recalled that, in this case, the evidence 
obtained by the ACCC from parties who received immunity and leniency 
was ultimately inadequate in establishing the ACCC’s allegations, even 
against those parties who had admitted fixing petrol prices in 
contravention of the CCA. In the light of this, a number of observations 
may be made.87  
 First, the ACCC must become more cautious about accepting or 
relying on information obtained through immunity applications without 
first conducting a detailed investigation into the facts and circumstances 
underpinning the ‘admissions’. This makes the process of obtaining 
immunity more complex, expensive and time consuming.  
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  Second, the ACCC’s need for admissible direct evidence of cartel 
conduct could lead it to grant immunity to the cartel participant who 
offered the ‘best’ direct evidence rather than the one who came forward 
‘first’. It could also make the ACCC more prepared to revoke conditional 
immunity in the event that the cooperating party did not provide accurate 
and comprehensive information.  
 Third, following the Geelong Petrol Case, trial judges may be more 
willing to exercise their discretion to decline to act on an admission, thus 
the totality of the ACCC’s evidence in a given case needs to be such that 
the correctness of the facts in the admission are not doubted by the court. 
This is likely to be a difficult onus to discharge.  
 Additionally, conditions attached to grants of immunity or leniency 
(for example, that the immunity or leniency applicant not be the 
ringleader of the conduct) would have to be reconsidered by the ACCC in 
order to combat judicial perception that such conditions provided an 
incentive for cooperating parties to ‘give evidence maximising the role of 
persons other than themselves as ringleaders or originators of any 
relevant conduct’.88  
C  Woollam 
1 Background 
Woollam signalled a departure from the Petrol Cases in the Court’s 
interpretation of what signified an ‘arrangement or understanding’. The 
ACCC alleged that the respondents engaged in or were a party to conduct 
that contravened TPA s 45(2)(a)(ii) and 45(2)(b)(ii), and further or 
alternatively TPA s 52, in relation to five tenders submitted to the 
Queensland Government for public works. The ACCC contended that the 
respondents had engaged in collusion prior to submitting their tenders. 
The alleged contraventions of the TPA were said to result from 
arrangements or understandings in relation to a practice known as ‘cover 
pricing’.89 
 It is generally understood by builders and tenderers in the Central 
Queensland and South East Queensland markets for building services to 
government that ‘cover pricing’ takes place as follows: 
 Builder A wishes to be seen to be tendering for a project it does not 
want to secure; 
 Builder A seeks a cover price from builder B who is known by builder 
A to be hoping to secure the project; 
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 Both know or believe that builder B will tender for less than the cover 
price and that Builder A will tender for the cover price or greater, if at 
all; 
 Builder A then tenders for no less than the cover price; and 
 Builder B then tenders for less than the cover price.
90
 
 The Court found that the term was well understood within the building 
industry.91 In this instance, the parties (Woollam and Kelly) admitted that 
their representatives had communicated about the provision of a cover 
price and set an amount agreed on as the cover price. The issue thus arose 
whether the provision of a cover price amounted to a contract, 





 The ACCC argued that the knowledge of the parties regarding the 
issue of cover pricing, together with their admitted communications, 
amounted to an ‘arrangement or understanding’ that (1) should Kelly 
decide to tender on the project, its tender price would be no less than the 
cover price, and that (2) Woollam’s tender price for that project would be 
less than the cover price.93  
 The respondents, however, submitted that the ACCC had failed to 
prove that (1) the parties had reached an ‘arrangement or understanding’; 
(2) that the purpose of the provisions of the alleged ‘arrangement or 
understanding’ was to fix, maintain or control prices of the proposed 
services; (3) that the provisions of the alleged ‘arrangement or 
understanding’ had or were likely to have the effect of fixing, maintaining 
or controlling prices of the proposed services; and (4) that they were in 
competition with each other in relation to that project.94 
3 Findings 
 Logan J rejected the respondents’ arguments, finding that, on a 
balance of probabilities, the corporate respondents had come to an 
‘arrangement or understanding’.95 He noted the requirement that an 
‘arrangement or understanding’ ‘must be consensual and carry with it an 
element of obligation rather than a mere expectation’.96 He further 
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 referred to the joint judgment of French CJ and Kiefel J in Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Channel Seven Brisbane Pty 
Ltd,97 where it was stated: 
An arrangement or understanding ordinarily involves an element of reciprocal 
commitment even though it may not be legally enforceable. It involves more 
than a mere hope or expectation that each party will act in accordance with its 
terms.98 
 The Court’s approach in this case echoed that of the Full Federal 
Court in the Ballarat Petrol Case, but the findings differed as the Court 
found in this instance that, although the arrangements in this case had 
been informal and by way of telephone conversations between 
subordinate staff members, the request for and giving of a cover price 
‘engendered more than just mere expectations’99 and amounted to an 
‘arrangement or understanding’. 
 Logan J also found that there had been the requisite meeting of minds 
for there to be an ‘arrangement or understanding’ between Woollam and 
Kelly in relation to the projects.100 In coming to this conclusion, he 
referred to the prior decision in Trade Practices Commission v Email Ltd, 
where Lockhart J stated: 
For there to be an arrangement or understanding there must be a meeting of 
the minds of those said to be parties to the arrangement or understanding. In 
some cases this may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. There must be 
a consensus as to what is to be done and not a mere hope as to what might be 
done or happen. Independently held beliefs are not enough.101 
 The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether there were mutual 
obligations, but not before citing the decision in Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd, in which 
Sackville J commented: 
There is no necessity for an element of mutual commitment between the 
parties to an arrangement or understanding, although in practice such an 
arrangement or understanding would ordinarily involve reciprocity of 
obligation.102 
 His Honour concluded that the two provisions (the requesting and 
giving of the cover price) conveyed a mutual commitment between the 
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parties.103 Consequently, it was held that the parties were in breach of 
TPA ss 45(2)(b)(i), (ii).104 
4  A Departure From the Petrol Cases 
 In Woollam, the Court took a different view of admissions by 
respondents from that taken by Gray J in the Geelong Petrol Case. As 
previously discussed, the Court in that instance declined to act on the 
admissions made by some of the respondents in their pleadings by 
relying, inter alia, on policy reasons and questioning the correctness of 
the admissions or ‘correctness of the facts admitted or agreed’.105 
Conversely, in Woollam, the Court regarded the admissions by the parties 
of entering into a ‘cover pricing’ agreement as direct evidence of an 
‘arrangement or understanding’ constituting a breach of s 45(2), 
notwithstanding evidence demonstrating that these types of arrangements 
were common in the building industry. While it is acknowledged that the 
case dealt with a different subject matter (the building industry), which 
may have impacted on the Court’s treatment of admissions in the context 
of the relationships between the parties, the Court nevertheless took a 
broader approach to the interpretation of the ‘arrangement or 
understanding’ requirement, as explained below.  
 In relation to the issue of ‘commitment’, the Full Federal Court in the 
Ballarat Petrol Case set a high evidentiary standard for proving that a 
respondent’s actions amounted to a commitment to an ‘arrangement or 
understanding’. Although the appellants had engaged in a course of action 
consistent with a commitment to increase petrol prices on 29 of the 
69occasions, this was not regarded as sufficient to constitute an 
‘arrangement or understanding’. However, in Woollam the Court rejected 
the respondents’ arguments that they had no more than an expectation as 
to how the other party would behave, despite evidence that the cover 
pricing arrangement was done at the request of one party for that party’s 
benefit and with no apparent sanctions should the other party fail to 
comply after agreeing to the request. Instead it found the arrangement 
between the parties to contain the requisite element of ‘obligation’ 
identified in previous cases as an essential element of an ‘arrangement or 
understanding’106 ‘even though it may not be legally enforceable’.107 
 The Court’s apparent willingness to place reliance on admissions by 
the parties, and additionally allow a wider interpretation of the 
‘arrangement or understanding’ requirement based on the acceptance by 
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 the parties that an ‘obligation’ existed between them, augurs well for 
future actions to be brought by the ACCC.  
IV  International Competition Law 
A  The European Standard of ‘Concerted Practices’ 
The concept of ‘concerted practice’ has been firmly entrenched in 
European competition law since 1993.108 In Australia, as noted above, the 
Harper Review panel recently recommended that CCA s 45 be extended 
to cover ‘concerted practices’ that have the purpose, or would be likely to 
have the effect, of substantially lessening competition.109 This would 
include the regular disclosure or exchange of price information between 
firms, whether or not it is possible to show that the firms reached an 
understanding about the disclosure or exchange.110 The issue of 
‘concerted practices’ is therefore a significant consideration in predicting 
future developments in this area of the law. It has previously been 
suggested that the concept of ‘understanding’ is not substantively 
different from the concept of ‘concerted practice’, and that the key 
difference is procedural.111  
 In European law, practices that may affect trade between Member 
States of the European Union (‘EU’) and which have as their object or 
effect the ‘prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market’, are dealt with in The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘The Treaty ’).112 Article 101(1) of this Treaty prohibits 
‘agreements’ and ‘concerted practices’ which may affect trade in this 
manner. An ‘agreement’ in this context has been held to require a 
‘concurrence of wills’ between at least two parties.113 However, a 
‘concerted practice’ does not require the same commitment and need only 
reflect a coordinated course of action by participants.114 A ‘concerted 
practice’ is merely a facilitating device, the economic effect of which is to 
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enable competitors 'to determine a coordinated course of action ... and to 
ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other's 
conduct regarding the essential elements of that action'.115 Under 
European law, a ‘concerted practice’ requires: (1) a direct or indirect 
contact between the parties;116 (2) the substitution of competition by 
cooperation;117 and (3) a causal link between the consensus and the 
‘concerted practice’.118  
 The contact between the parties may include meetings, discussions 
and participation at conferences,119 and a single meeting may be enough 
to meet the requirement.120 Statements of intention made to a competitor 
clearly indicating the commercial conduct that will follow may be 
regarded as a ‘concerted practice’.121 In Cimenteries CBR v Commission 
of the European Communities (‘Cimenteries ’), the Court of First Instance 
of the European Communities held it to be ‘at least sufficient that, by its 
statement of intention, the competitor should have eliminated, or, at the 
very least substantially reduced uncertainty as to the conduct to expect of 
the other on the market.122 
 There must also be a relationship between cause and effect.123 That is 
to say, the concerted conduct must result in altered conduct by the 
parties.124 Significantly, in applying the ‘concerted practice’ provision, 
once the first two elements are proven a rebuttable presumption arises 
that concertation was followed in the market.125 Thus, the presumption 
that the concertation was put into practice follows from the first two 
elements and the defendant has the onus of proving the contrary.126  
 Brooks has expressed the view that, if the EU rebuttable presumption 
had been adopted in Australia, the outcomes in the Petrol Cases may have 
been different. In the Ballarat Petrol Case,127 Anderson and Apco may 
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 have found it difficult to rebut the presumption, as under the European 
test Anderson’s equivocal statements and the fact that he viewed himself 
as an independent would most likely not have amounted to ‘public 
distancing’. In the Geelong Petrol Case,128 it is likely that repeated 
communications of petrol retailers would have amounted to the 
presumption of a ‘concerted practice’ and it would have been difficult for 
the defendant to rebut this presumption.129 
 The difference in the onus of proof between the current Australian 
provisions and the EU ‘concerted practice’ provision is therefore a 
significant issue when considering the Harper Review recommendation 
that s 45 be extended to include a ‘concerted practice’ provision. If the 
proposed provision follows the EU form, it may have a drastic effect on 
the ability of the ACCC to prove breaches of these provisions. 
Significantly, European law does not contain a per se prohibition on 
price-signalling,130 which would further align the Australian competition 
law landscape with European law. 
B  The Canadian Approach 
In Canada, offences related to competition are regulated by the 
Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34 s 45 (‘The Canadian Act ’). Part 
45(1) provides that: 
Every person commits an offence who, with a competitor of that person with 
respect to a product, conspires, agrees or arranges  
(a)  to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of the product;  
(b)  to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or 
supply of the product; or  
(c)  to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or 
 supply of the product.  
 The penalty for a breach of the part is imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 14 years or a fine not exceeding $25 million, or both, with 
limited defences pursuant to ss 45(5) and (6). Unlike Australian law, the 
sanction is a purely criminal one and the evidence required in a 
prosecution by the Canadian Government is specified in s 45(3) as 
follows:  
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In a prosecution under subpart (1), the court may infer the existence of a 
conspiracy, agreement or arrangement from circumstantial evidence, with or 
without direct evidence of communication between or among the alleged 
parties to it, but, for greater certainty, the conspiracy, agreement or 
arrangement must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 While the Canadian provisions are similar to the price-fixing 
prohibitions of the CCA, the Australian provisions in CCA ss 44ZZW, 
44ZZX have amplified the ACCC’s enforcement capabilities significantly 
by prohibiting unilateral disclosures, as discussed above. For present 
purposes, it is instructive to observe the approach of the Canadian courts 
as demonstrated by that of the Superior Court of Quebec in R v Darby 
(‘Darby ’),131 which dealt with price-fixing in the petrol industry.  
1 Darby 
 Darby was the director, president and majority shareholder of Service 
Autogarde DD Inc, a company that operated two service stations under 
the Shell banner in Sherbrooke. It was common cause that he was 
responsible for setting the price of gas sold at these service stations. In 
2011, Darby pleaded guilty to an indictment stating that he had conspired 
with several people in order to unduly prevent or lessen competition in 
the retail sale of regular gasoline in the Sherbrooke market by price-
fixing, thereby committing the criminal offence provided in the Canadian 
Act s 45(1)(c). Of the 66 service stations in Sherbrooke, 54 took part in 
the offence as conspirators.132  
 The investigation showed that one of the instigators of the price 
increases in the Sherbrooke and Magog markets was Bourassa, a 
representative for Global Fuels Inc, who set the price of gas sold at Olco 
service stations. In general, Bourassa would contact Bonin, Aubut or 
Bonami, representatives at the Centre de prix de Couche-Tard Inc, in 
order to determine the time of the price increase and the new price after 
the increase. Once he had received assent, Bourassa continued his calls to 
service stations controlled by Global Fuels Inc in Sherbrooke and Magog 
as well as to some of his competitors and collaborators who in turn passed 
on the information.133 
 This decision comprises the sentencing stage in Darby’s guilty plea, in 
consequence of which he sought an absolute discharge and offered to 
donate an amount of at least $10 000 to charity.134 However, the Court 
found that the penalties for similar offences committed during virtually 
identical time periods and involving either businesses or individuals 
ranged from 12-month terms of imprisonment to be served in the 
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 community together with fines or donations from $10 000 to $50 000 for 
individuals.135 Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, 
including the fact that Darby had derived a personal benefit from higher 
fuel prices set with his co-conspirators,136 Darby was convicted and fined 
$10 000 — the maximum penalty recommended by the prosecution.  
 Darby did not deal with substantive issues as the offender had entered 
a guilty plea. On its facts, the case shared many similarities with the 
Petrol Cases as it dealt with the issue of one dealer conspiring with others 
in order to prevent or lessen competition in the retail sale of gasoline by 
price-fixing. However, it is worth noting that Australian transgressors are 
also subject to civil penalties, which require the lesser burden of proof of 
‘on the balance of probabilities’, thereby increasing the risk of penalty for 
potential offenders in the petrol industry.  
V  Analysis and Conclusion 
In the past there was a fine line between what did and did not constitute a 
price-fixing ‘contract, arrangement or understanding’. Despite the Court’s 
approach in the Geelong Petrol Case, the question still remains as to why 
the respondent petrol retailers would continue to advantage their 
competitors by providing them with prospective pricing information. An 
economist might suggest, for instance, that the sharing of this information 
reassures competitors that they will not be on their own if they raise their 
prices, that such behaviour over a lengthy period amounts to a course of 
conduct suggestive of an ‘arrangement or understanding’, or both.137  
 Woollam may have foreshadowed a departure from the previously 
stringent interpretation of these requirements by allowing a wider 
interpretation of the ‘arrangement or understanding’ requirement. The 
later price-signalling provisions took a leap forward by including private 
price-disclosures to competitors made outside the ordinary course of 
business and disclosures made for the purpose of substantially lessening 
competition in the market.138 These prohibitions are still currently 
restricted to the banking sector and no measures have been taken to 
extend the provisions to other sectors. However, if the Harper Review 
recommendations are implemented it will obviate the need for the later 
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the accused had no criminal record, pleaded guilty, had similar duties within the conspiracy 
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price-signalling provisions, as the extension of s 45 to include a 
‘concerted practice’ provision will significantly improve the ability of the 
ACCC to prove breaches of these provisions.  
 There are clearly similarities between the ‘concerted practice’ 
requirement under European law and the ‘understanding’ requirement 
under the Australian legislation, as both are characterised by three 
constituent elements that are broadly similar in nature. A ‘concerted 
practice’ requires direct or indirect contact between the parties, the 
substitution of competition by cooperation, and a causal link between the 
consensus and the ‘concerted practice.’139 Similarly, in order to prove an 
‘understanding’ under Australian law, it is necessary to show 
communication between the parties, a meeting of the minds or consensus 
about the conduct to be engaged in, and a commitment by at least one 
party to engage in the conduct.140 One factor that distinguishes these 
requirements is that, in order to meet the elements of ‘concerted practice’, 
no ‘commitment’ to engage in the practice is required.141 However, some 
form of reciprocity is necessary.142 This includes a situation whereby one 
party discloses information and ‘another passively receives or accepts 
it’.143 As suggested by Brooks, when one compares the requirements of 
the European and Australian provisions, the concept of ‘understanding’ 
does not appear to be substantively different from the concept of 
‘concerted practice’. The key difference appears to be procedural.144 
Given these similarities, the Harper Review recommendations for 
changes to the Act are pertinent and timely. 
 Furthermore, as noted above, the difference in the onus of proof 
between the current Australian provisions and the EU ‘concerted practice’ 
provision would be addressed by the Harper Review’s extension of s 45 
to include a ‘concerted practice’ provision. From a practical perspective, 
this may improve the ability of the ACCC to prove breaches of these 
provisions. Significantly, European law does not contain a per se 
prohibition on price-signalling (seen as a sub-category of price-fixing),145 
which will further align the Australian competition law landscape with 
European law. 
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  The Harper Review panel recognised that the current prohibitions 
against price-signalling in the CCA do not accurately address the 
distinction between anti-competitive and pro-competitive conduct, and 
that they are also deficient in their limited application to the banking 
industry.146 The Harper Review also cautioned that a per se prohibition 
has the potential to overreach, and has proposed that anti-competitive 
price-signalling be included in s 45.147  
 In his covering letter to the Final Report, Ian Harper proposes that the 
implementation of the proposed changes to s 45 (in conjunction with 
other recommendations of the Review Panel) will ‘reinvigorate 
competition’ and ‘help to raise Australia’s productivity levels and living 
standards’.148 It will also markedly improve the ability of the ACCC to 
prove instances of price-fixing in the petrol industry and more broadly. 
Rod Sims, Chair of the ACCC, had previously expressed regret at the 
sector-specific focus of the later provisions, stating that ‘competition laws 
should apply economy-wide and not be sector-specific’.149 In the 
implementation of the Harper Review recommendations, the price-
signalling provisions should be replaced by an extended s 45 (which 
currently governs contracts, arrangements and understandings that affect 
competition) that includes ‘concerted practices’, which ‘have the purpose, 
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition’.150 This 
extension of s 45 will provide the necessary inclusion for instances of 
price-signalling and simultaneously ease the burden on the ACCC in 
proving breaches of the CCA.  
 The ACCC has consistently vowed to remain ‘extremely vigilant’ in 
dealing with collusion and potential price-fixing cartels,151 and 
prosecuting conduct which lessens competition with vigour.152 The 
implementation of the Harper Review price-fixing recommendations in 
respect of s 45 will support these objectives, and assist the ACCC in its 
quest to eliminate price-fixing in the petrol industry, along with the 
banking industry and other sectors in general.  
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